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NEW VOICES: RETHINKING THE SOURCES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW
This panel was convened at 9:00 a.m., Thursday, March 26, by its moderator, Anthony
D'Amato of Northwestern University, who introduced the panelists: Evan Criddle of Syracuse
University College of Law; Evan Fox-Decent of McGill University Faculty of Law; Annecoos
Wiersema of the Ohio State University Moritz College of Law; Martins Paparinskis of the
University of Oxford; and Anastasios Gourgourinis of the UCL Faculty of Laws.
DERIVING PEREMPTORY NORMS FROM SOVEREIGNTY

By Evan J. Criddle* & Evan Fox-Decentt
In international law, the term "jus cogens" refers to norms that are considered peremptory
in the sense that they are mandatory and do not admit derogation. Although the jus cogens
concept has achieved widespread acceptance, international legal theory has yet to furnish a
satisfying account ofjus cogens's legal basis. We argue that peremptory norms are inextricably
linked to the sovereign powers assumed by all states. The key to understanding international
jus cogens lies in Immanuel Kant's discussion of the innate right of children to their parents'
care. Drawing on Kant's account, our theory of jus cogens posits that states exercise sovereign
authority as fiduciaries of the people subject to their power. An immanent feature of this
state-subject fiduciary relationship is that the state must comply with jus cogens. The fiduciary
theory clarifies jus cogens's content by generating discrete criteria for identifying peremptory
norms.
I. KANT'S MODEL OF FIDUCIARY RELATIONS

To apprehend the fiduciary character of state legal authority, consider the structure of
familiar fiduciary relations such as trustee-beneficiary, agent-principal and parent-child.
Fiduciary relationships arise from circumstances in which one party (the fiduciary) holds
discretionary power of an administrative nature over the legal or practical interests of another
party (the beneficiary), and the beneficiary is vulnerable to the fiduciary's power in that she
is unable, either as a matter of fact or law, to exercise the entrusted power. This administrative
power is other-regarding, purposive, and institutional; it is held so as to be used on behalf
of others, for limited purposes, and within the framework of a legal institution such as a
family or a corporation. Beneficiaries generally are unable to protect themselves against an
abuse of fiduciary power and depend on the fiduciary to promote their entrusted interests.
If multiple classes of beneficiaries are subject to the same fiduciary power, the fiduciary's
basic duties are fairness or even-handedness as between beneficiaries and reasonableness
in the sense of having due regard for the beneficiaries' separate interests.
Kant sets out the moral basis for fiduciary obligations in an argument concerning the duties
that parents owe their children. For Kant, legal rights embody the realization of a person's
moral capacity to put others under legal obligations. Fiduciary obligations to children stem
from the parents' unilateral creation of a person who did not consent to be a party to the
parent-child relationship and who cannot survive without support. These circumstances trigger
Assistant Professor, Syracuse University College of Law.
Assistant Professor, McGill University Faculty of Law. This essay is adapted from Evan J. Criddle & Evan
Fox-Decent, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens, 34 YALE J. INT'L L. 331 (2009).
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the child's moral capacity to place the parents under a fiduciary duty to provide for her
security.
Extending Kant's reasoning, the dignity intrinsic to legal personality supplies the moral
basis for fiduciary obligation in other contexts as well. A relationship in which the fiduciary
has unilateral administrative power over the beneficiary's interests can be understood as a
relationship mediated by law only if the fiduciary (like the parent) is precluded from exploiting
her position to set unilaterally the terms of her relationship with the beneficiary. The fiduciary
principle therefore authorizes the fiduciary to exercise power on the beneficiary's behalf,
but subject to strict limitations arising from the beneficiary's vulnerability to the fiduciary's
power and her intrinsic worth as a person. In the case of the state-subject fiduciary relationship,
we argue now that these limitations include jus cogens norms.
II. FIDUCIARY STATES

The argument for the state as a fiduciary draws on the fiduciary concept's general constitutive features. Legislative, executive, and judicial powers exhibit the institutional, purposeladen, and other-regarding characteristics that constitute administration. Legal subjects, as
private parties, are not entitled to exercise public powers and thus are peculiarly dependent
upon, and vulnerable to, public authority. It follows that the state's sovereign powers give
rise to a fiduciary obligation.
To see by way of illustration that the minimal content of this obligation includes jus
cogens, consider the peremptory prohibition against slavery. The fiduciary principle authorizes
the state to secure legal order on behalf of every agent subject to state power. Because each
person is an equally valid subject of the fiduciary authorization of state authority, each must
be accorded an equal opportunity to acquire rights which can enshrine and protect their
respective interests. It follows that a state cannot support slavery without contravening its
most basic fiduciary obligation to ensure that each agent subject to its powers is regarded
equally as a person capable of possessing legal rights. Indeed, since the fiduciary principle
regards every individual as an equal co-beneficiary of legal order, the fiduciary state must
protect every individual against all forms of arbitrary discrimination (such as apartheid).
Furthermore, under the fiduciary theory, jus cogens norms arise from the very concept
that tends to be pitted against it-sovereignty-precisely because all states exercise sovereign
powers which trigger application of the fiduciary principle. By positing the state as a fiduciary
of its people, the fiduciary theory co-opts sovereignty by deriving peremptory norms from
the very powers that are constitutive of it.
III. CRITERIA FOR IDENTIFYING PEREMPTORY NORMS
Unlike previous theories of jus cogens, the fiduciary theory points to discrete formal
and substantive criteria that establish necessary and sufficient conditions for identifying
peremptory norms.
The fiduciary theory borrows its formal criteria from Lon Fuller's internal morality of
law, a set of desiderata that legal norms should aspire to satisfy irrespective of their substantive
aims. Peremptory norms must embody general and universalizable principles. They must
also be public, clear, feasible, consistent with other like norms, relatively stable over time,
and prospective rather than retroactive. Norms that flagrantly violate any of these principles
would either frustrate the state's fiduciary mission or simply subvert the state's ability to
establish legal order, and therefore they would lack any justification from the point of view
of the fiduciary model.
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Three further necessary and substantive conditions flow from the structure and content of
the fiduciary theory. First is a principle of integrity: peremptory norms must have as their
object the good of the people rather than the good of the state's officials. Second is a principle
of formal moral equality: the fiduciary state owes a duty of fairness or even-handedness to
the people subject to its power. Third is a principle of solicitude: peremptory norms must
be solicitous of the legal subject's legitimate interests.
The fiduciary theory's three substantive criteria, like the formal criteria, establish necessary
rather than sufficient conditions of jus cogens. Most, if not all, human rights conform to
them. Even when considered collectively, the formal and substantive criteria enumerated
thus far do not provide a basis for distinguishing peremptory norms from nonperemptory
norms.
Happily, the fiduciary theory points to other substantive criteria capable of specifying
peremptory norms. The fourth substantive criterion ofjus cogens is a principle offundamental
equal security: norms that are indispensable to the fundamental and equal security of individuals qualify as peremptory norms. For example, some international prohibitions such as the
norms against genocide, arbitrary killing, and wars of aggression target state actions that
literally annihilate a state's subjects. Others such as the prohibitions against slavery and
apartheid protect subjects from systemic domination. Because respect for such norms is
indispensable to the state's specific fiduciary obligation to secure legal order, the state cannot
derogate from these norms under any circumstances. The principle of fundamental equal
security thus enables us to distinguish nonderogable from derogable norms, and thereby
supplies a sufficient condition to the necessary formal and substantive conditions that precede it.
Significantly, the principle of fundamental equal security is not a necessary condition
because another independently sufficient condition is implicit within the state's obligation
to secure legal order: adherence to the rule of law. The fifth substantive criterion of jus
cogens is a procedural principle regarding the rule of law: a norm will count as jus cogens
if respect for it is indispensable to securing legality for the benefit of all.
IV. RETHINKING THE CANON OF PEREMPTORY NORMS
The fiduciary theory's formal and substantive criteria provide a practical framework for
identifying peremptory norms. Seven categories of norms appear in the influential Restatement
on Foreign Relations of the United States as illustrations of international jus cogens: the
prohibitions against genocide; slavery or slave trade; murder or disappearance of individuals;
torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; prolonged arbitrary
detention; systematic racial discrimination; and "the principles of the United Nations Charter
prohibiting the use of force." Tellingly, each of these norms merits peremptory treatment
under the fiduciary theory because they deny a state's subjects secure and equal freedom.
The fiduciary theory also clarifies jus cogens's applicability to other international norms.
Consider, for example, the norm against public corruption. The prohibition against public
corruption satisfies the fiduciary theory's substantive criteria by advancing the best interests
of the people rather than state officials, and by requiring the state to treat its national patrimony
as a public good to which every national has an equal claim under the rule of law.
The fiduciary theory also distinguishes norms that do not qualify as jus cogens. For instance,
the fiduciary theory excludes the prohibition against piracy from the ranks of jus cogens.
Article 15 of the Convention on the High Seas defines piracy as "illegal acts of violence,
detention or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or passengers
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of a private ship or private aircraft." To merit recognition as a peremptory norm under the
fiduciary theory, the prohibition against piracy would have to be repackaged as a constraint
on state authority. Absent a clear nexus to the state-subject fiduciary relationship, however,
the prohibition against piracy is best classified as a common crime.
V.

CONCLUSION

We have argued that the fiduciary nature of state legal authority furnishes a persuasive
explanation for peremptory norms and their relationship to state sovereignty under international law. Peremptory norms such as the prohibitions against slavery and torture are not
exceptions to state sovereignty, but rather constitutive constraints flowing from the statesubject fiduciary relationship itself.
CONFERENCES OF THE PARTIES TO MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL
AGREEMENTS: THE NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW-MAKERS?

By Annecoos Wiersema*
What do Conferences of the Parties (COPs) to multilateral environmental agreements
contribute to international legal obligations? What does the answer mean for how we think
about fragmentation in the international legal system?
Multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) have proliferated over the past decades
and are central to international environmental law. To operate on an ongoing basis, these
MEAs generally establish an institution known as a Conference of the Parties-a COPmade up of representatives of the states parties to the MEA. These COPs meet regularly and
are the supreme body of the treaty.
COPs regularly engage in a number of activities, some of which follow the traditional
model of international law as based on the consent of states, such as formally amending the
treaty text, amending appendices or annexes, and concluding protocols-new treaties-under
a framework convention. In all of these examples, the COP activity requires the consent of
a state before that state is bound or allows for a form of opt-out. However, another set of COP
activity forms the subject of this discussion. More specifically, COPs also pass resolutions and
decisions that do not require the formal consent of states parties to the treaty to come into
effect and do not provide for any kind of opt-out by an objecting state. This activity requires
only consensus or even a simple majority vote to bind all states parties to the treaty, whether
or not they voted in favor of the resolution or decision.
This activity-which I term consensus-based COP activity-is a significant force in international environmental law.' Some of it has direct effect on the parties' substantive obligations,
i.e., their external obligations. For example, under the Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer, the COP is authorized to adopt adjustments and reductions to the
allowances states have for production or consumption of ozone-depleting substances through
Assistant Professor of Law, Michael E. Moritz College of Law, Ohio State University.
For alternative, but important, perspectives on how we should treat COP activity under international law,
see Robin R. Churchill and Geir Ulfstein, Autonomous InstitutionalArrangements in MultilateralEnvironmental
Agreements: A Little-Noticed Phenomenon in InternationalLaw, 94 AJIL 623 (2000); Jutta Brunne, Reweaving
the Fabricof InternationalLaw? Patternsof Consent in EnvironmentalFrameworkAgreements, in DEVELOPMENTS
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TREATY MAKING 101 (Riidiger Wolfrum and Volker Rdben eds., 2005); Jutta Brunnie,

COPing with Consent: Lawmaking under MultilateralEnvironmental Agreements, 15 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 1 (2002).
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either consensus or a two-thirds majority vote.2 COP activity can also indirectly affect the
external obligations of the parties, for example, by elaborating and interpreting language of
3
the treaty that defines the parties' obligations.
Other consensus-based COP activity is directed only at the internal obligations of the
parties. For example, criteria for listing of species on the appendices of the Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species are intended to influence how the parties vote at
the COP.4 Although these criteria do not directly alter the parties' external obligations, by
altering what states should consider in determining whether to restrict trade in certain species,
they inevitably influence the course of the treaty. In the same manner, compliance and dispute
resolution procedures developed by COPs can also have an effect on the overall treaty, even
when they are internally directed.
This consensus-based COP activity has a significant effect on states' legal obligations
under MEAs. Yet, the activity does not result in resolutions or decisions that can be divorced
from the underlying treaty. COP decisions and resolutions are almost invariably tightly
connected with the original treaty and enrich it by deepening and thickening the parties'
obligations. They deepen the obligations by contributing to implementation and effectiveness.
They thicken the obligations by adding to the text of the original treaty through interpretation
and guidance.
This tight connection to the treaty and the deepening and thickening effect makes
COP activity hard to evaluate according to our traditional classifications of the sources
of international legal obligation: treaties and customary international law. If consensusbased COP activity is viewed as independent from the underlying treaty and is evaluated
according to the standard tests for hard international law obligations-whether as treaty
law or customary international law-it is unlikely to meet these tests and will not be
considered hard law.
If consensus-based COP activity is not hard law-or rarely hard law-can we simply refer
to it as soft law and move on? This is the approach most commentators take. However, the
term soft law is also unhelpful for a full understanding of the relationship of consensusbased COP activity to the parties' substantive legal obligations under the underlying treaty.
Adding soft law to the binary framework of hard law and non-law simply adds another
layer to a hierarchical framework. It does not challenge the hierarchy itself. Soft law is still
not law. This tripartite classification does not adequately capture the particular relationship
that COP activity has with the underlying legal obligation of the treaty. For, to the extent
that COP resolutions and decisions deepen and thicken the treaty obligations, it is no longer
possible to argue that the treaty obligation stands at a hierarchically superior position than
the COP obligation. They are inextricably intertwined.
2 Montreal Protocol on Ozone-Depleting Substances art. 2(9), Sept. 16, 1987, 26 ILM 1541, amended text
available at <http://www.unep.orglozone/pdfs/Montreal-Protocol2000.pdf>.
For example, the COPs of the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands have passed numerous resolutions adopted by
simple majority of the parties interpreting key terms of the treaty, arguably changing the emphasis of the treaty.
See Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat, Feb. 2 1971, T.I.A.S.
No. I1, 084, 996 U.N.T.S. 245 [hereinafter Ramsar Convention]; Annecoos Wiersema, A Train Without Tracks:
Re-Thinking the Place of Law and Goals in Environmental and Natural Resources Law, 38 ENVTL. L. 1239,
1291 (2008).
4 See Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T.
1087; Criteriafor Amendment of Appendices I and II, Conf. 9.24 (Rev. CoP 14), 9h Meeting of the Conference
of the Parties to CITES (Nov. 7-18, 1994), amended at the 14' Conference of the Parties to CITES (Jun. 3-15, 2007).
5 Brunnee, Reweaving the Fabric,supra note 1, at 111.
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I argue that, instead of trying to fit consensus-based COP activity into these frameworks
by asking whether it is law, we should be asking a different question. The question we need
to ask if we want to accurately understand the significance of consensus-based COP activity
for states' international legal obligations is: what is the relationship of consensus-based COP
activity to the underlying treaty obligations of the parties to that treaty?
Why does it matter how we frame the question, or even what legal status we accord this
kind of consensus-based COP activity? The way in which we address this activity can have
a number of consequences, a few of which I outline briefly here.
First, the way in which a tribunal frames the question about the status of consensus-based
COP activity can have a real effect on whether that tribunal will view COP resolutions and
decisions as affecting parties' international legal obligations.6
Further, when we see the legal significance of COP activity, we begin to see a picture of
an increasingly sectorally fragmented international legal system.7 At the same time, reframing
the question about the role of COP activity offers opportunities to better manage this sectoral
fragmentation. For example, within dispute resolution settings, recognizing the relationship
between consensus-based COP activity and the underlying treaty might allow for use of the
interpretive provisions of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties by
tribunals reaching beyond their own regimes for understandings of principles addressed by
multiple treaties, such as the precautionary principle.8 Even beyond dispute resolution settings,
recognizing the legal significance of COP activity might allow states to form linkages across
treaty regimes as a way to manage sectoral fragmentation.
Finally, understanding the significance of consensus-based COP activity and its close
relationship to the legal obligations of the parties to the underlying treaty may have implications for how we understand activity in other areas of international law beyond MEAs. For
example, what does our understanding of COP activity tell us about the work of international
organizations? Does it have implications for work carried out under the auspices of treaty
regimes in other areas of international law, such as human rights law, even if that work is
carried out by bodies other than COPs? These questions can only be fully explored if we
ask the right question: what is the relationship between consensus-based COP activity and
underlying treaty obligations of the states parties to that treaty?
INVESTMENT PROTECTION LAW AND SOURCES OF LAW:

A

CRITICAL LOOK

By Martins Paparinskis*
INTRODUCTION

During the last decade, investment arbitration has made a considerable contribution to the
development of investment protection law. This essay will address some sources of law
implications arising from the extensive reliance that investment arbitration tribunals place
6See Natural Resources Defense Council v. Environmental Protection Agency, 464 F.3d I (D.C. Cir. 2006);
Jonathan Verschuuren, Ramsar Soft Law is Not Soft At All, available at <http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1306982>
(copy on file with author).
7 On sectoral fragmentation, see Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Gunther Teubner, Regime-Collisions: The Vain
Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentationof Global Law, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 999 (2004).
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
D Phil Candidate, the Queen's College, University of Oxford; AHRC and Commercial Bar Scholar. I am
grateful for the comments at the ASIL panel discussion. I thank the Queen's College and the Law Faculty of the
University of Oxford for their financial support for my attendance at the conference.
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on the case law interpreting pari materiatreaty rules. The essay suggests that Jessup's 1927
call for caution in the development of the law on the treatment of aliens is still relevant:
[T]here is an overwhelming necessity for definite criteria ... but I deny the implication
that merely because there is a necessity for this definite position that you have the right
to inject into international law a criterion merely because it is definite without ascertaining
whether that criterion is actually accepted. We cannot dismiss something as a generality
in favour of something which is definite merely because one is definite and one is
general, unless the definite criterion is actually accepted.'
IDENTIFYING THE ROLE OF ARBITRAL CASE LAW

Tribunals may reference case law in a number of ways. The earlier decisions may have
explained the relevance of general concepts in the particular context.2 The earlier decisions
may have interpreted a similar rule in an inspirational way. The earlier decisions may have
employed certain arguments that can be applied by analogy. While there are shades of
difference between different legal arguments, there is a point when reliance on earlier awards
goes further than that. The case law regarding open-textured substantive rules (e.g., mostfavoured-nation ('MFN') treatment, indirect expropriation, and fair and equitable treatment)
shows a case-by-case fleshing out and refinement of presumptions, criteria, and sub-criteria
on the basis of particular factual circumstances. Such a fact-based law-elucidation would be
hard to justify otherwise than if undertaken regarding the same applicable rule of law.
Since, due to historical developments, investment protection law is largely set out in legally
unconnected bilateral treaties, it is necessary to address the mutual relevance of these interpretations.3 The next sections will consider some arguments for treating pari materia interpretations as legally relevant for the interpretation of other treaties.
OLD EXPLANATIONS OF ARBITRAL CASE LAW

Arbitral Case Law and Ordinary Meaning
The ordinary meaning that parties had in contemplation at the time when they concluded
a treaty may refer to the established meaning of like terms in earlier instruments, and this
4
meaning may also be established through means of judicial interpretation. However, the
natural inter-temporal qualification is that the meaning is established before the treaty is
concluded. The argument therefore has limited application to investment protection rules,
where most contentious issues were either not arbitrated at all (up to the late 1990s), or
resolved in radically divergent ways (after that).

21 ASIL PROC. 29, 35-36 (1927).
'Discussion,
2
E.g., the explanation of the role of cause, object, forum selection, and attribution in treaty claims regarding
contractual issues, Compaiiil de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal v. Argentina, ICSID Case No.
ARB/97/3, Decision on Annulment, July 3, 2002, 17 ICSID REv. 168 (2002).
3Martins Paparinskis, Barcelona Traction: A Friendof Investment Protection Law, 8 BALTIC YBK OF INTL L.
105 (2008).
4 Elihu Lauterpacht, The Development of the Law of InternationalOrganizationby the Decisions of International
Tribunals, 152 RECUEIL DES CouRs 377, 396 (1976 IV); Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea
(Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, 2009 ICJ REP. (February 3), obtainablefrom <www.icj-cij.org>, I[ 133-134.
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Arbitral Case Law and Generic Terms
Generic treaty terms follow the development of international law,5 and there is no reason
of principle why this development could not draw upon arbitral interpretations of bilateral
treaties. However, it is not clear whether the investment protection rules are of a generic
nature, particularly in light of other evolutionary tools like MFN clauses and reference to
customary law available to states. It is also not clear whether the divergent views expressed
by tribunals authoritatively reflect the contemporary meaning. Most importantly, this approach
would misstate the traditional generic term argument distinguishing between the source and
destination of the inter-temporal renvoi, and turn it into a circular argument where each rule
simultaneously occupies both positions.
Arbitral Case Law and Supplementary Materials
Arbitral awards are material sources of law, and Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties ('VCLT') permits the application of non-exhaustive supplementary
materials in treaty interpretation. 6 However, to identify both concepts seems problematic.
Awards as material sources would not become part of the primary rules even if they authoritatively explained their content. This argument would also go against the grain of the VCLT,
which does not direct the interpreter to developments completely extrinsic to the treatymaking and parties. Finally, the supplementary materials could not be anyway used beyond
the limits of each particular treaty.
Arbitral Case Law and Customary Law
Article 31(3)(c) of VCLT directs the interpreter to 'any relevant rules of international law
applicable in the relations between the parties.' If the interpreter finds customary law, the
development of law through investment arbitrations would be on safe normative grounds,
since the same applicable law would apply in all cases. However, this argument cannot
explain the development of those rules that have no customary law background (e.g., MFN
treatment). It also raises questions about the possibility of referring to customary law when
the treaty wording is slightly different (like expropriation) and when the treaty and customary
law are alleged to prescribe different content (like fair and equitable treatment and international
minimum standard).
NEW

EXPLANATIONS OF ARBITRAL CASE LAW

Whatever approach one takes, it is complicated to defend a general incorporation of legal
reasoning regarding the development of all kinds of rules. In light of this, two new approaches
have been suggested that may be described as the 'weak' and 'strong' arguments for consistency.
The 'weak' consistency argument considers 'the applicable law ... by definition ... different

for each BIT,' and therefore argues for a jurisprudence constante.7 It is true that in a treaty
5 Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turkey), Judgment, 1978 ICJ REP. 3, 33, 1 [ 77-78 (Dec. 19).
6 The Canadian Cattlemen for Free Trade v. Canada, UNCITRAL Arbitration, Award on Jurisdiction, Jan.28,
164-169.
2008, available at <http://ita.1aw.uvic.ca/documents/CCFT-USAAwardOOO.pdf>, 9U[
SGS Societ6 G6rrale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case Nos. ARB/02/6 and
ARB/04108, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, Jan. 29, 2004, available at <http://ita.law.uvic.cal
documents/SGSvPhil-final001.pdf>, 1 97.
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dispute, applicable law in the first instance will be different for each treaty, but in the second
instance, Article 31(3)(c) of VCLT may lead the interpreter to the applicable law of custom
that would be (pace special custom) identical for all treaties. The concept of jurisprudence
constante does not seem to add much to the analytical tools that the interpreter already
possesses regarding the application of general concepts (cause, object, attribution, etc.) to
particular rules.
The 'strong' consistency argument argues for harmonious development of the law in light
of well-established case law.8 When the applicable law is customary law, to rely on established
case law explaining the content of the rule is a normal technique for identifying custom.
However, when the applicable law is different treaty law, the consistency of the arbitral
case law (interpreting e.g. 10 treaties) is hard to justify as directly legally relevant for the
interpretation of 2,600 other treaties.
While an argument for 'new' rules of interpretation permitting greater flexibility is not
impossible, it is unlikely that such rules have emerged. States argue, and tribunals accept,
the rules of VCLT. When tribunals are conceived as engaging in law-making, the state
practice is disapproving. The responses by NAFTA states to perceived activist tribunals
through Article 1128 submissions, the NAFTA Free Trade Commission, and changes in
treaty practice support the traditional sources of law. Whatever a priorijurisprudential reasons
for consistency states may be presumed to have, practice shows them as satisfied with the
existing framework encapsulating the procedurally and substantively fragmented system.
CONCLUSION

In 1930, the Hague Conference on Codification failed in codifying the law on the responsibility for treatment of aliens, leading to serious criticisms and reappraisals of apparently
established rules. One reason for the failure was that developing states suspected developed
states of abusing law-making methods (leading to debates about sources of law for five out
of the available twelve days).9 In 2009, Jessup's words of caution cited above sound just as
persuasive. Considering the scepticism already expressed in state practice, it may be advisable
to reconsider the benefits of a more formalistic approach to sources with a clearer identification
of applicable law, so as to avoid another '1930' backlash.
EQUITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW REVISITED (WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO
THE FRAGMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW)

By Anastasios Gourgourinis*
INTRODUCTION

This contribution suggests that when discussing "international law as law" in the circumstances of today, it is worth revisiting the current and prospective normative role for the
8 Saipem S.p.A. v Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/07, Decision on Jurisdiction and Recommendation
on
Provisional Measures, Mar. 21, 2007, 22 ICSID REv. 100, 1 67 (2007).
9
IV LEAGUE OF NATIONS CONFERENCE FOR THE CODIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [1930] 1442-76, 1583

(Shabtai Rosenne, ed., 1975).

Ph.D. Candidate, Faculty of Laws, University College London (UCL); Greek State Scholarships Foundation
Scholar in International Economic Law; Member of the Athens Bar. The Author is indebted to Professor Catherine
Redgwell (UCL) and Dr. Fiona Smith (UCL) for their advice, guidance, and overall support, and further gratefully
acknowledges the constructive comments received during the 2009 ASIL Annual Meeting panel discussion. Special
thanks are further due to the UCL Faculty of Laws for the travel grant awarded to attend the ASIL Meeting. The
usual disclaimer applies.
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principle of equity in the sphere of international legal relations. Hence, by undertaking a
normative assessment of the principle of equity and equitable principles as normative 'tools'
in international legal reasoning, the discourse infra will focus on their potential relevance
in the ambit of the still on-going debate on the normative fragmentation of international
law resulting as a consequence of the diversification of international regulation via treatyestablished, subject-matter specific regimes.
THE NORMATIVITY OF EQUITY AND EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW

While commentators are rather hesitant in categorizing equity per se as a formal source
of international law,' the fact that international courts and tribunals can apply equity and
equitable principles as part of general international law is fully reaffirmed by international
case law. 2 For, according to the ICJ, "equity as a legal concept is a direct emanation of the
idea of justice...the legal concept of equity is a general principle directly applicable as law." 3
Judge Weeramantry has provided an elaborate account of the "routes of entry" of equity,
i.e., how equity fits with the framework of sources of international law (mainly treaty, custom,
and general principles).4 Probably equity's most prominent route of entry, early identified
ever since Judge Hudson's much cited dictum in the Meuse Case,5 is via general principles
of law. In a fashion that reflects a certain duality, while equity has permeated international
law as a general principle eo nomine (what is generally referred to as equity infra, praeter
and contra legem), it also has found expression in equitable principles (such as good faith,
unjust enrichment, abuse of rights, estoppel, acquiescence and so on) themselves endowed
with international legal validity as general principles of law of Art. 38 (1)(c) ICJ Statute;6
in this sense, they form part of general international law, that is the set of international norms
that are binding erga omnes (as contrasted to erga omnes partes, as in the case of treaties).
Based on the drafting deliberations of what is now the ICJ Statute,7 it appears that equitable
and general principles of law both constitute the "general principles of justice" referred to
in Norwegian Shipowners' Claims.8 For, it is here suggested that equity (as part of international
law) and equitable (general) principles of law should be viewed as essentially different facets
of the same concept, the former denoting the normative process and the latter denoting the
normative means. The lack of reference to equity in what is now Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ
Statute was eventually counterbalanced by the inclusion of general principles of law applicable
in foro domestico. Ergo, being treated separately by some authors, 9 on the one hand equity
' E.g., Michael Akehurst, Equity and GeneralPrinciples of Law, 25 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 801, 807 (1976).
2 E.g., CHRISTOPHER R. Rossi, EQUITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: A LEGAL REALIST APPROACH TO INTERNA-

TIONAL DECISIONMAKING 59-86 (1993).
Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment, 1982 ICJ REP. 18, 71
(Feb. 24).
4 1993 ICJ REP., U 74-102 (Weeramantry, J., sep. op.). For further analysis, see Anastasios Gourgourinis,
Delineating the Normativity of Equity in InternationalLaw, 11 INT'L COmM. L.REv. 327 (2009).
5Diversion of Water from the River Meuse (Netherlands v. Belgium), 1937 PCIJ, ser. A/B, No. 70, at 76 (Hudson,
J., ind. op.).
6See Oscar Schachter, InternationalI.aw in Theory and Practice, 178 RECUEIL DES COURs 13, 83 (1982 V).
Permanent Court of International Justice, Advisory Committee of Jurists, Procks-verbaux of the Proceedings
of the Committee, June 16-24, 1920, with Annexes, at 296, 307, 310-315, 318, 324, 332, 336, 338.
Norwegian Shipowners Claims (Nor. v. U.S.), 1 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 307, 331 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1922).
9See the discussion in Romualdo Bermejo, Place et rble de li'quite dans le droit internationalnouveaux, 36
OzoRV 219, 229-232 (1986).
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has been faced with skepticism for vagueness and lack of predictability, 0 while 'stand-alone'
general principles of law have lapsed into a considerable degree of obscurity regarding their
origin, practical utility and modus operandi, overtly disadvantaged to treaty and custom. 1'
As a result, equity and equitable principles should be assessed as a 'whole.'
Moreover, and at a parallel analytical level, it can be additionally suggested that it is
further feasible to normatively assess equity and equitable principles through the lens of the
primary norm/secondary norm process-type differentiation, long-known from the work of
the International Law Commission (ILC) on State Responsibility.1 2 For, it appears that while
equity and equitable principles can be themselves subject to breach,13 they can also deal
with the consequences of breaches of other primary norms.14
EQUITY AND EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES AS INTERSTITIAL

NoRMS

Interstitial norms, according to Vaughan Lowe, are those which are necessary in the process
of legal reasoning, operating in the interstices of primary norms, dealing with issues of
overlaps and conflict between the latter.' 5 Underlying Lowe's argument is the idea that
application of norms is a "process of juristic evaluation" aimed at harnessing the negative
consequences stemming from the fragmentation of international law. The utilization of
interstitial norms as modifying norms falls in the hands of judges, not as law but as reason
adjusted to the function of law, so as to regulate the normative interaction of other, primary
norms.
Indeed, Lowe treats interstitiality from a quasi-normative perspective: interstitial norms
cannot generate normative consequences in their own name. Their lack of normativity is
eventually balanced by their usage by judges; it is not the interstitial norm that matters, but
rather the use judges make of it. Nevertheless, the proposition made here follows a different,
normativeroute. While interstitial norms can be taken to include conflict-resolution techniques
such as lex posterior and lex specialis, they can arguably include equity and equitable
principles as primary or secondary norms. For, indeed, Lowe's reference to abus de droit
and unjust enrichment as examples of interstitial norms provides further support to this line
of argument.
In this sense, it can be further argued that equity and equitable principles as interstitial
norms can operate as positive catalysts vis-ii-vis the fragmentation of international law, i.e.,

6

10E.g., Joseph Hendel, Equity in the American Courts and in the World Court:Does the End Justify the Means?,
& COMP.L.REV. 637, 665-677 (1996).

IND.INT'L

" See BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS
[reprinted] 3-6 (2006); Martti Koskenniemi, General Principles:Reflexions on Constructivist Thinking in International Law, OIKEUSTIEDE-JURISPRUDENTIA 117 (1985).
12 Roberto Ago, Second Report on State Responsibility, [1970] Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 177, 179, UN Doc. A/

CN.4/SER.A/1970/Add.1.
13 E.g., Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions Between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), Judgment,
2001 ICJ REP. 94, 248 (Jul. 1); Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, Commentary to Art. 5, 13, in Report
of the ILC on the Work of Its Fifty-eighth Session, UN GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 16, UN Doc. A/61/
10 (2006).
14 E.g., Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Commentary to Art. 45,
1, and Art. 56, in Report of the LLC on the Work of Its Fifty-third Session, UN GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10,
at 43, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in [20011 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 74, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/
Add.1 (Part 2).
1 Vaughan Lowe, Sustainable Development and UnsustainableArguments, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SusTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: PAST ACHIEVEMENTS AND FUTURE CHALLENGES, 19 (Alan Boyle & David Freestone

eds., 1999); Vaughan Lowe, The Politics of Law-making: Are the Method and Characterof Norm Creation
Changing?, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND

INTERNATIONAL LAW 207 (Michael Byers ed., 2000).
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increasing the 'rate' of normative harmonization of norms derived from distinct subjectmatter specific regimes (infra legem interpretative function); also, as negative normative
catalyst, i.e., resolving the conflict between competing norms derived from distinct treatyestablished regimes (praeter and contra legem function).
A PRIMA FACE VIEW OF EQUITY'S RELEVANCE IN THE FRAGMENTATION
DEBATE: THE GEORGES PINSON CASE

A prima facie indication of equity's relevance in the fragmentation debate can be traced
back to the 2006 Final Report on the topic of fragmentation issued by the ILC appointed
Study Group.16 Inter alia, the Report largely draws from the much-cited dictum from the
1928 Georges Pinson case 7 in order to introduce the so-called concept of "principles of
international law proper" into the fragmentation analysis-distinct from Art. 38(l)(c) of the
ICJ Statute-as a possible proper normative response to the problems posed by the normative
fragmentation of international law.18
Nevertheless, the introduction of this allegedly novel concept appears to be based upon a
misreading of the actual dictum's term "droit internationalcommun," as it features in the
original French version of the Georges Pinson award.' 9 In actuality, Professor Verjiil, acting
as the Presiding Comnissioner in casu, was using the term as simply referring to general
international law, that is, the set of international norms binding erga omnes. But aside from
the circularity of the Study Group's above position, a closer look at the Pinson award actually
reveals a further element of general international law: in the earlier pages of the Georges
Pinson award, Umpire Verzijl stated that equity in international law operates as a "subsidiary
source" or as a "superior principle." 20
Consequently, it would be feasible to argue that for purposes of fragmentation discourse,
equity has a potential normative role to play. Equity and equitable principles can be prima
facie viewed as operating as a "subsidiary source" vis-a-vis under-regulation in the international sphere, i.e., vis-a-vis the existence of lacunae regarding legal responses to normative
conflicts in 'hard' cases (praeterlegem function). Alternatively, they can be viewed as a
corrective "superior principle" vis-a-vis over-regulation, i.e., vis-a-vis 'hard' cases where
the application or non-applicability of existing norms for the resolution of normative conflicts
(e.g. lex posterior,lex specialis)may lead to manifestly unjust results (contralegem function).
CONCLUDING REMARKS
To conclude, this contribution has submitted that the equity and equitable principles, as
part of general international law, indeed appear to have a potential normative role in situations
of normative complexity resulting from the fragmentation of the international legal system;
and furthermore, that this normative role for equity merits future doctrinal attention.
16ILC, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of
International Law, Report of the Study Group of the LLC, Finalized by Martti Koskenniemi, UN Doc. A/CN.4/
L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006) [hereinafter Fragmentation Report].
17Georges Pinson (France) v. United Mexican States [hereinafter Georges Pinson], 5 R. Int't Arb. Awards 327
(Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928).
18See Fragmentation Report, supra note 16, at 94 (fn 237), 96, 233, 234, 254.
19Georges Pinson, supra note 17, at 422.
20 Id. at 355 (Author's translation).

